However, we might expect that the degree of candidate accommodation to the local electorate would vary with the level of political competition. The key intuition is that representatives from safe seats should be able to more safely disregard the views of independents and minority party voters in their constituencies than can representatives from marginal seats.
Hence, regardless of what might be the case in non-competitive seats, when elections are expected to be very close it still seems plausible that candidates of each party will moderate their positions toward those of the median voter in the district. The notion that safe seats should produce more extreme candidates than competitive ones is a widely held view among U.S. journalists, as shown in this quote from a story in the New York Times: "The increasing partisan use of redistricting means that there are fewer swing districts in the U.S. House, thus fewer lawmakers in the middle" (Toner, 2004) . 1 On the other hand, this is not the common wisdom outside the U.S., even in countries that also use plurality-based single member district elections. Consider, for example, this quote: "In voting in the British House of Commons, the more marginal the seat, the more extreme the position" (Baughman, 2004) .
It is certainly conceivable that we can have extremism positively correlated with competition in the British Parliament, but the exact opposite relationship in the U.S. House of Representatives. But another possibility is that the assertion in the New York Times linking swing seats in the U.S. House to legislator moderation is simply, as a matter of empirical fact, wrong. Indeed, there is a very recent body of political journalism in the U.S. suggesting that, when confronted with (potentially) very close contests, instead of reaching out to centrist voters, candidates may now seek to mobilize their own support base in terms of turnout and campaign support by espousing non-centrist positions which are especially attractive to their own party's supporters. Moreover, recent empirical work finds that, while, in the U.S. House "competition exerts some pressure on candidates to fit with their constituents… that degree of responsiveness waned in the 1980s and 1990s" (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001:136) .
We present a neo-Downsian model to explain the patterns that scholars such as Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001) identify, namely the absence of a clear positive link between district competitiveness and candidate convergence. We model the complex interac-tions of political competition, partisan loyalties, and incentives for voter turnout to try to understand when office-seeking candidates, especially candidates in close elections, will take positions far from the district median, thereby seeking to mobilize their voter base to turn out by adopting positions attractive to the party faithful, rather than appealing to the median voter by moving towards the center. The consequences of our model are assessed by a combination of analytic and computer simulation techniques. Our work is part of a recent tradition of modifying classic Downsian assumptions in order to produce more empirically realistic outcomes. 2 In particular, we extend recent theoretical work of Adams, Merrill, and Grofman (2005, Chapters 7-8) , that analyzes candidates' strategic responses to partisan bias and the threat of abstention.
The centripetal "pull" of the median voter is widely viewed as the most important factor that tethers office-seeking candidates near the center of the voter distribution. But, research into political behavior has long offered reason to question the dominance of spatial considerations, instead drawing attention to voting decisions driven by partisan ties or candidate features (see e.g., Campbell et al., 1960 and the vast literature following). Our results point to a revised understanding of the interplay of strategic candidate positioning, party reputation, and electoral choice. 3 We show that, even in highly competitive races, and for electorates that include substantial proportions of independents, office-seeking candidates have substantial incentives to appeal to their partisan constituency. 2 See, also Aldrich, 1995; Erikson and Romero, 1990; Roemer, 2001; Schofield and Sened, 2006; Peress 2006; Serra 2008 . Work by Groseclose and Snyder (2000) , Erikson and Wright (2000) , and Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) has addressed Congressional elections in particular. 3 The results of our modeling are also consistent with important experimental work by Van Houweling and Sniderman (2005) that explores how voters' partisan loyalties alter the logic of the Downsian space. These authors suggest that the constraints of the median voter are less stringent than have been supposed, and that partisan elites have more -although not limitless -freedom of maneuver than has been appreciated (Van Houweling and Sniderman 2005, page 3). 4 They also follow without recourse to arguments based on centrifugal considerations created by the need to appeal to party activists campaign support or to raise money, or considerations of future support for higher office by the party hierarchy
II. A Model of Voter Choice and Turnout
A number of models have been developed to explain divergent strategies. Callander and Wilson (2006) obtain a divergent equilibrium, assuming abstention due to alienation and the threat of third party entry (see also Palfrey, 1984) . Schofield and Sened (2005, 2006) 
where a is the salience of ideology, x i is voter i's ideological position, p iD and p iR are dummy variables that equal 1 if i identifies with the candidate's party and zero otherwise, b represents the salience of party identification, and ε iD and ε iR are random disturbance terms. We further represent the deterministic components of utility as and . We specify that ) , ( D x V i ) , ( R x V i a>0 and b≥0, i.e. that voter utilities decline with the ideological distance to the candidate, and that partisanship cannot bias the voter against his party's candidate. This latter specification encompasses both the standard spatial model in which partisanship does not influence voters (b=0) and the more general case in which partisanship biases the voter in favor of his party's candidate (b>0).
Our specification, that the voter's party identification influences her evaluations of the candidates independently of her ideological position, is supported by empirical research on presidential elections (Markus and Converse, 1979; Nagler, 1995, 1998) , Congressional elections Wright, 1993, 1997; Ansolabehere et al., 2001; Krasno, 1990) , and gubernatorial elections (Lacy and Paolino, 1999) . This finding is consistent with the "Michigan model" of voting (Campbell et al., 1960) , in which partisanship is conceptualized as a long-term, affective orientation towards one's preferred party -one that grows out of early socialization experiences and positive evaluations of the party's past performanceand which is largely independent of the candidates' positions in the current election (see Fiorina, 1981; Jennings and Niemi, 1975, 1981; Green et al., 2002 ). Previous spatial modeling work by Erikson and Romero (1990) , Adams, Merrill, and Grofman (2005, chapters 7-8) , Butler (2006) , and , analyzes American candidates' strategies in situations where voters display such partisan biases.
We assume that citizens' turnout decisions depend on whether they find either of the candidates sufficiently attractive to turn out to vote. Specifically, let T i (A) represent voter i's alienation threshold, which is the minimum candidate utility such that i prefers voting for the candidate to abstaining. We specify this threshold as a function of a constant term, A, plus a random variable ε iA that depends on unmeasured, voter-specific, characteristics such as political efficacy, education, etc.:
We assume that citizen i votes for candidate D if her utility for D, U i (D), exceeds both her utility for R, U i (R), and her alienation threshold T i (A); that she votes for R if U i (R) exceeds U i (D) and T i (A); that otherwise she abstains.
Our vote-choice model is conditional logit, a model that has been used extensively in empirical voting studies (see Endersby and Galatas, 1998; Burden and Lacy, 1999; Merrill and Adams, 2002 
The turnout model we employ is a simplified version of the one developed by Lacy and Burden (1999; see also Burden and Lacy, 1999) , which they have applied to U.S. presidential elections (see also Adams, Dow, and Merrill, 2006) . Note that this model specifies that voter abstention is driven entirely by alienation from the candidates, rather than indifference between them. While empirical studies suggest that substantial numbers of American voters do indeed abstain due to alienation (see Adams, Dow, and Merrill, 2006; Brody and Page, 1973; Guttman et al., 1994; , clearly this is a strong assumption. Nevertheless we employ this specification because we have found that incorporating abstention from indifference into the model greatly complicates our analysis of candidate strategies, but that -providing that alienation also contributes to abstention -it leaves our central substantive conclusions unchanged.
III. Theoretical Results: Implications for Candidate Strategies
We assume that the voter distribution consists entirely of three groups of citizens: a given by m D , m R , and , respectively, where
, and where m D and m R are strictly positive. We denote the mean voter location ) (
as the center of the voter distribution, and without loss of generality we set 0 = V µ . We also assume that the mean location of independent voters is the same as the overall voter mean, i.e.
We will look at how, via effects on the expected closeness of the election, candidate strategic behavior is affected by the size of each of these constituencies, and their respective degree of mobilization. Adams, Merrill, and Grofman (2005, chapter7) present illustrative arguments that, in election contexts similar to the one described above, office-seeking candidates contesting general elections have incentives to diverge from the center of the voter distribution, in the direction of their partisan constituencies. Here we move beyond these illustrative arguments to present theoretical results on the existence and characteristics of candidates' Nash equilibrium strategies. Following previous spatial modeling studies with variable voter turnout, we assume that both candidates select positions that maximize their expected vote margins over their opponent (Hinich and Ordeshook, 1970; Anderson and Glomm, 1992) .
7 Candidate D's expected margin over R, , is given by the sum over all voters of the following expression: (Enelow and Hinich, 1989) . However matters are quite different when voters exhibit partisan loyalties (i.e., b>0). In this situation it is easily verified from equations 1-2 that 0 < c D < 1 and 0 < c R < 1, 9 and hence that as a→0 each candidate's equilibrium position diverges to a location between the mean voter position and the mean position of the candidate's partisan constituency. We therefore conclude that when voters display partisan bi-8 This follows from the fact that when b = 0, then the expression that appears in the numerator of both equations 1 and 2 equals zero. Why, specifically, are margin-maximizing candidates motivated to shift away from the center, in the direction of their partisans? The reason is that the marginal change in a candidate's probabilities of attracting her own partisans' votes via policy appeals is higher than is the marginal change in her probabilities of attracting votes from the rival candidate's partisans. To understand why this is true, note that the properties of the conditional logit (CL) probability function imply that the weight w i that a candidate attaches to a voter i's policy preference increases as the probability that i votes for the candidate approaches 0.5 (from 10 This follows from the fact that the functions c D and c R are, by inspection, invariably positive when b>0. 13 This conforms to common sense: the more uncommitted the voter's decision to turn out to vote for a candidate, the more the candidate will take the voter's preferences into account Romero, 1990, p.1107) . In a two-candidate election where voters have nonzero probabilities of abstaining, the higher of the voter i's two vote probabilities must be the one nearest 0.5, and hence i is most marginal with respect to the candidate that i is most likely to support. Because, when b>0 and a→0, partisan voters are guaranteed to be more likely to vote for their party's candidate than for the opposition party's candidate, it follows that under these conditions candidates attach greater weight to the policy preferences of the members of their own partisan constituency than to the preferences of the members of the rival candidate's constituency.
To grasp the intuition outlined above without recourse to mathematics, consider the extreme situation where voters' partisan biases are so strong that they invariably prefer their party's candidate to the rival party's candidate, regardless of the candidates' positions, but where partisan voters are also prone to abstain, so that they turn out to vote only if they approve of their preferred candidate's policy position. In this scenario each candidate can influence the turnout decisions of the members of her own partisan constituency via her policy positioning, but the candidates cannot influence the behavior of the members of their rival's partisan constituency -since by construction the rival party's partisans invariably prefer the rival candidate and, furthermore, these partisans' turnout decisions depend solely on the rival candidate's positioning. Therefore in this hypothetical scenario each candidate's optimal strategy is to weight the policy preferences of her own partisan constituency (along with the preferences of any independent voters in the electorate), while ignoring the policy preferences of the rival party's partisan constituency.
Next, we relate equations 1-2 in Theorem 1 to the degree of candidate divergence:
Corollary to Theorem 1 (The Polarization Gap). For the conditions specified in Theorem 1, then, for a fixed proportion m I of independent voters, the divergence between the candidates' equilibrium positions is greatest when the Democratic and Republican partisan con-13 This is also true for the multinomial probit probability function, in the general case where the correlations between the error terms associated with the candidates' utilities are set to zero, and the error terms have equal Why might candidates be most dispersed when the election is expected to be most competitive? The intuition can be grasped by considering the least competitive election context, namely that in which all citizens in the electorate identify with the same party. If, say, all citizens are Democratic partisans, then the Democratic candidate will appeal on policy grounds to these partisans, and so will the Republican candidate because she has no viable alternative strategy -since by construction there are no Republican partisans to whom this candidate can appeal. Therefore margin-maximizing candidates will converge to identical positions in this "perfectly" uncompetitive scenario, and, by extension, they can be expected to converge to similar positions for partisan contexts that strongly favor one party over the other. By contrast, in competitive districts, each candidate's optimal strategy is to appeal in large part to his/her own partisan constituency, which motivates increased divergence of the candidates' positions.
IV. Computational results.
While Theorem 1 and its corollary (the Polarization Gap) provide intuitions about candidate strategies, their empirical relevance is unclear because they apply only to elections where voters place limited weight on the candidates' policy positions. However Table 1 and Figure 1 present computations on Nash equilibrium strategies -i.e., positions toward which we can expect office-seeking candidates to approach as they seek to maximize their expected vote margins over their opponent -for significantly positive values of the policy salience pa-rameter.
14 These optimal strategies are given for each party's candidate against systematic variation of the partisan composition of the electorate. In part A of the table (and of the candidates' ideological positions are calibrated along a 1-7 scale. 15 The (deterministic component of the) alienation threshold, A, is set at 2, which implies that -realistically for congressional elections -about half or more of the potential electorate does not vote (see column 7 in Table 1) . Table 1 and Figure 1 report computations that suggest that the substantive conclusions suggested by Theorem 1 and its corollary (The Polarization Gap) extend to these scenarios.
Note first that for these computations we invariably located a unique equilibrium in marginmaximizing candidates' strategies. Furthermore, the computations suggest that the factors which cause the candidates' equilibrium positions to diverge for low degrees of policy salience will exert similar effects for higher degrees of policy salience (represented by the policy salience parameter a): namely, the candidates' equilibrium positions diverge from the mean voter position in the direction of their partisan constituencies, and the degree of candidate di-14 These numerical calculations were adapted from the algorithm in Appendix 4.1 of Adams, Merrill, and Grofman (2005) . 15 In fact, divergence of optimal strategies occurs for any plausible positive value of the partisan loyalty parameter b (up to 10 times as high as the estimated value), for any plausible value of the parameter A that specifies abstention due to alienation (up to almost complete abstention), and for any positive value of the ideologysalience parameter a. In addition, we note that the optimal strategies reported in Table 1 and Figure 1 , which are computed for realistic values of the ideology salience coefficient a, are similar to but even more divergent than the equilibrium locations given by equations 1-2 in Theorem 1, which are obtained theoretically for the special case in which a approaches zero.
vergence peaks when the candidates have equal-sized partisan constituencies, i.e., when the election is most competitive, and declines as the relative sizes of these partisan constituencies diverges, i.e., as the election becomes less competitive (see column 4 in Table 1 ). Note, in addition, that candidate divergence is less when there is a significant proportion of independent voters in the electorate (Table 1B) than when all voters are partisans (Table 1A) . Thus, the values and appear to be good qualitative indicators of the equilibrium configuration; as increases, the configuration is similar but more dispersed.
IV. Discussion
Although we provide arguments that party ID and abstention effects motivate divergence between Democratic and Republican candidates, we do not argue that these are the only possible explanations of partisan polarization. Candidates may need to hew the national party line to get precious national party support, such as campaign funding, and to be accepted into the governing structure if they reach Congress or avoid retaliation in the form of being redistricted out of their seats. On the local as well as the national level, candidates may be drawn to more extreme positions by party activists, who tend to be more polarized than the general public (Schofield, 2004; Miller and Schofield, 2003) . Alternatively, candidates may face opposition in primaries, which may induce them to adopt more extreme positions than would maximize votes in the general election (see Burden, 2001; Polsby, 1983; V.O. Key, 1947; Owen and Grofman, 2006; Adams and Merrill, 2008) .
Nonetheless, we have shown that, even in the absence of the considerations that most previous theorists have advanced to explain candidate divergence (i.e., the desire to appeal to special interest groups and party activists, the need to win primary elections, and so on), office-seeking candidates have incentives to diverge sharply from the center of the general electorate. Our theoretical and empirical results, which suggest that candidates can, under realistic conditions, maximize their vote margins in general elections by presenting policies designed to appeal to their partisan constituencies, is relevant to the extensive literature on elections and representation.
Dating back to Miller and Stokes's (1963) seminal work, scholars have conceptualized congressional representation in terms of the Miller-Stokes "diamond model" which emphasizes the linkages between legislators' roll-call votes and the policy preferences of their geographic constituencies, defined as the set of all voters from the legislator's district. However subsequent work has cast doubt on how well this diamond model captures the representational process; in particular, scholars have increasingly emphasized the crucial influence of the legislator's "reelection constituency" (Fenno, 1978) , defined as "the people who are reliable supporters at the ballot box" (Uslaner, 1999, page 10, emphasis in original) . 16 Uslaner summarizes the current state of the research as follows:
The [Miller-Stokes] model has served us well for a long time, but diamonds aren't forever… A more profound challenge to the diamond model comes from the recognition that legislators tend to represent their core supporters, mostly composed of their fellow partisans, better than they do the full electorate. (Uslaner, 1999, page 12) .
The value of our theoretical results is that they provide a plausible rationale for the empirical finding that legislators tend to represent their core supporters at the expense of their geographic constituency: namely, that this is an electorally optimal strategy.
In addition, as we observed in the introduction to this essay, our emphasis on the centrifugal effects on candidate strategies associated with voter turnout in a partisan electorate is one that is increasingly shared, both by the popular media and by campaign managers (see Miniter, 2005; Nagourney, 2003; Millbank and Allen, 2004 The starting point for both Democrats and Republicans is to make sure that they take into battle the core of loyalists that this era has bequeathed them. But since neither party's core support or base is big enough to assure victory, each struggles valiantly to make more of it -in the first instance, by growing the groups that are the most loyal, by fanning the passions on each party's lead issues to achieve even greater unity in their voting and more energy and greater turnout at the polls (2005, pages 91-92).
The theoretical results we have presented are exactly in tune with the arguments advanced by the political professionals quoted above. By shifting their policies away from the median voter's position in the direction of their partisan constituency's policy preferences, candidates increase the unity in their partisan ranks, as Greenberg emphasizes, and candidates simultaneously energize their base to turn out to vote, as both Dowd and Greenberg emphasize. The importance of our theoretical arguments is that they illuminate why the turnout gains that candidates obtain from targeting their base are likely to outweigh the vote losses among moderate voters that noncentrist positioning would seem to entail. In particular, in a partisan electorate, voters' candidate preferences are rarely in doubt -so that moderate Democratic and Republican partisans will support their party's candidate at high rates even when these candidates propose radical positions -which give candidates the leeway to shift away from the center, in order to boost turnout among their core supporters. Thus we have
shown that the strategic logic of candidate positioning in a partisan electorate with variable turnout is dramatically different from the strategic logic that obtains when we disregard voters' partisan loyalties (cf. Hinich and Ordeshook, 1970) . And, most importantly we have been able to account for the seemingly counterintuitive, but empirically observed, phenomenon that, even though candidates of both parties adjust their politics slightly away from national party positions to more closely fit the ideological distribution in the district being contested, in closely competitive districts Republican and Democratic candidates are just as far away from one another (or even further) than they are in highly homogenous districts that tend to be safe for the candidates of one party or the other. As indicated in Adams, Merrill, and Grofman (2005: 54) . The ideology-salience parameter, a, is set at 0.25; the partisan parameter b is set to 2; and the alienation threshold is set at 2. Solid symbols indicate candidates whose expected vote-share (on a probabilistic basis) is at least 50 percent of the electorate, i.e. those candidates who are most likely to be elected. Open symbols indicate candidates less likely to win election. In part B, assumptions are the same as in part A, except that one third of the electorate are independents. For the curves with circular symbols, independents are assumed to have the same ideology-salience parameter a as partisans; for those with triangular symbols, independents have no policy preferences. The horizontal axis denotes the Democratic proportion among partisans.
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